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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports results from a public good experiment conducted in the 
African nation of Botswana. Our findings provide a test of whether' African 
communalism' influences willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods. As 
globalization expands markets, and economies such as Botswana's continue to 
modernize, there is an increasing need to understand how cultural factors might influence 
the valuation of public goods. We find evidence that stated willingness to contribute to a 
public good in a hypothetical setting is higher than actual contribution levels in a real 
setting. However, this is only true in the second and final round of the experiment, when 
participants in the real setting have learned to significantly lower their contribution 
levels. The results draw into question the existence of a communal spirit in economically 
emergent Africa when it comes to the provision of public goods. 
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Communalism versus the Incentive to Free-Ride: 
Experimental Results from Economically Emergent Africa 
Abstract. This paper reports results from a public good experiment conducted in the African 
nation of Botswana. Our findings provide a test of whether 'African communalism' influences 
willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods. As globalization expands markets, 
and economies such as Botswana's continue to modernize, there is an increasing need to 
understand how cultural factors might influence the valuation of public goods. We find evidence 
that stated willingness to contribute to a public good in a hypothetical setting is higher than 
actual contribution levels in a real setting. However, this is only true in the second and final 
round of th~ experiment, when participants in the real setting have learned to significantly lower 
their contribution levels. The results draw into question the existence of a communal spirit in 
economically emergent Africa when it comes to the provision of public goods. 
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Communalism versus the Incentive to Free-Ride: 
Experimental Results from Economically Emergent Africa 
1. Introduction 
Experimental studies of bargaining behavior and public-good provision have only recently been 
extended to international and cross-cultural settings. For example, Roth et al. (1991) find that 
latent cultural differences partially explain observed variation in two-player ultimatum 
bargaining games, but not in multi-player market behavior. Henrich (2000) finds a similar (but 
stronger) cultural effect for ultimatum bargaining between a sample of U.S. graduate students 
and Machiguenga tribesmen in the Peruvian Amazon.} In a more recent paper addressing the 
universality of hypothetical bias in dichotomous-choice contingent valuation (CV) settings, 
Tanner et al. (2007) find that the extent of this bias differs across location and cultures. Taken 
together, these experimental studies suggest that cultural differences can explain some of the 
variation in behavior associated with standard bargaining frameworks.2 The current paper adds 
to this nascent experimental literature by measuring the extent to which hypothetical bias and 
similar problems associated with the provision of public goods exist in economically emergent 
Africa? 
The findings from the current study are important in two respects. First, the study adds to the 
accumulating body of knowledge about how different cultural or national identities influence 
economic behavior. As globalization expands markets, and economies such as Botswana's 
continue to modernize, there is an increasing need to understand how cultural factors will 
I Henrich et aI. , (2001) expands the scope of these findings to 15 s~all-scale societies in 12 countries on five 
continents. . 
2 To the contrary, Slonim and Roth (1998) and Cameron (1999) find little or no evidence ofa cultural effect on 
ultimatum bargaining behavior. 
3 Hypothetical bias is any deviation of an individual's stated willingness to pay (WTP) from his true or revealed 
WTP due to the hypothetical nature of the good or payment mechanism. Positive (negative) hypothetical bias 
occurs when stated willingness to contribute is higher (lower) than the actual contribution level. 
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influence the valuation of public goods. This in turn motivates the additional need to measure 
the degree to which hypothetical bias might distort these valuations. 
Second, our study provides test of whether 'communalism' as espoused by African h~storians 
and philosophers is able to overcome the standard problems associated with the provision of 
public goods.4 With respect to Botswana, Jensen and Gaie explain the communal ethic through 
metaphoric juxtaposition of the words motho (meaning the individual identity of a person) and 
botho (meaning a community of persons): 
"Botho is complex in that it supposes the primacy of the community whilst on the other hand, 
simultaneously maintains and recognizes the importance of the individual. .. . the individual has 
the right and duty to pursue what is in their interest and what is in their interest should be rightly 
seen as a member of the community of interests. The individual can only find fulfillment in the 
collective while the collective can only be fulfilled by individual participation. In short botho 
presupposes the integration of society with the individual members playing a significant role in 
this integration as nicely captured by another Setswana saying that "motho ke motho ka ba 
bangwe" (a person is a person by and through others) (page 7)." 
Cultural anthropologists have examined how socio-economic disruptions caused by early 
white settlement and recent modernization have led to the erosion of communalism and 
cooperation as social norms throughout southern Africa (Schapera, 1938 and Comaroff, 1985). 
In light of these societal changes, we test whether the Botho communal ethic is strong enough to 
overcome the coordination problems associated with the provision of public goods. 
In stark contrast to Tanner et aJ. ' s (2007) result for university students in Niger, which 
suggests the existence of negative hypothetical bias, we find evidence of positive hypothetical 
bias among our sample of university students in the country ofBotswana.5 In other words, we 
4 See Senghor (1965), MenKiti (1979), Shutte (1993), Gyekye (1997), and Wiredu and !rele (2006) for in-depth 
discussions of African communalism. 
5 It is important to remember that, similar to the vast majority of experimental studies in the literature, our sample 
consists solely of university students. This suggests that a communal spirit in Botswana may not be as strong among 
the younger, higher-educated generation as living standards rise over time. It remains an open question as to 
whether such a spirit persists in older and younger less-educated generations. 
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find evidence that stated willingness to contribute to a public good in a hypothetical setting is 
higher than actual contribution levels in a real setting. However, this is only true in the second 
and final round of the experiment, when participants in the real setting have learned to 
significantly lower their contribution levels. The results draw into question the existence of a 
communal spirit in economically emergent Africa when it comes to the provision of public 
goods. 
We acknowledge that degree of hypothetical bias is not a relative measure of a given 
culture's effect on the provision of public goods. A relative measure would help answer the 
question, is the level at which individuals voluntarily contribute to the provision of a public good 
large or small relative to, say, another nation or cultural group? Thus, estimating the degree of 
hypothetical bias at best provides an absolute measure of the effect of culture on public good 
provision. In the present context "absolute" means the degree to which cooperation (or 
communalism) in the provision of the public good is feigned. For example, if positive 
hypothetical bias is found in our sample, then we have some evidence for rejecting the 
hypothesis that the degree of cooperation found in a hypothetical setting will be sustained in a 
real setting, i.e., that a genuine cooperative ethic may not be as strong as we might otherwise 
have presumed. At worst, the cooperative ethic might not exist at all. 
In the next section, we discuss the experimental design used in this study to test for 
hypothetical bias in our sample. In Section 3 we discuss both our sample frame and the data 
obtained from our public good experiment. Section 3 also provides summary statistics. Our 
empirical model is presented in Section 4, and the results based on this model are provided in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Experimental Design 
The primary objective of the experiment is to create a laboratory to test whether African 
communalism helps participants avoid the standard problems associated with the provisi9n of 
public goods, such as coordination failures and the incentive to free ride. To accomplish this 
objective, we incorporate several specific features into the experiment.6 
First, we elicit values for a 'generic' rather than a 'homegrown' public good. In this way, we 
avoid confounding our measurement of hypothetical bias with any social determinants of the 
good's value. For example, if we had instead selected 'expanded wilderness protection in the 
Kalahari Desert' or 'private funding for secondary education' as the public good for which 
values were to be elicited, social pressures such as the 'purchase of moral satisfaction' 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) and the 'desire to conform socially' (Bernheim, 1994) would 
have been more likely to confound our estimates of hypothetical bias.7 Further, our goal was to 
maintain as many traditional features of public good experiments as possible, such as induced 
valuation and the incentive to free ride.8 This is perhaps best accomplished by eliciting values 
for a generic public good. 
Second, we wish to create a scenario that closely mimics how CV has traditionally been 
conducted in the field. This entails elicitation ofWTP for a public good without the imposition 
of a provision-point mechanism, or closed-referendum format. A provision-point mechanism 
typically sets a minimum positive aggregate contribution threshold necessary for provision of the 
public good (Rondeau et aI, 1999). The main advantage of this type of mechanism is its 
incentive-compatibility (Carson et aI., 2000). However, in cases where a realistic provision point 
6 The experimental design is presented in the Appendix. 
7 Expanded wilderness protection in the Central Kalahari Desert and private funding of secondary school education 
are two popular issues in Botswana at the moment. 
8 For further details on public good experiments, see chapter two in the Handbook on Experimental Economics by 
Ledyard (1995). 
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is unknown (which seems to be the predominant case in the CV literature), imposition of such a 
mechanism is unrealistic. We therefore use an open-referendum format in our experiment so that 
no minimum positive aggregate contribution threshold is arbitrarily set prior to eliciting t~e 
participants' WTP values.9 
Third, we designed the experiment to test for the presence of hypothetical bias. The 
existence of hypothetical bias indicates that although individuals may wish to contribute at high 
levels, they understand the inherent coordination problems and incentives to deviate from the 
cooperative strategy. Toward this end, half the participants were given the option of contributing 
to the public good using real ~oney (revealed-preference group), while the other half simply 
stated their hypothetical contribution level (stated-preference group). By contrasting the average 
contribution levels of the two groups, we are able to directly test for the existence of hypothetical 
bias. 
Fourth, we provide an information treatment where half the participants read through an 
example of the experiment themselves and then the researcher quickly re-read the example out 
loud. Participants were allowed to ask questions about the experiment at any point in time. Also 
as part of the information treatment, two sentences were added to the second-to-Iast paragraph of 
the example, 
"What this row of numbers tells us is that the payout is 5 Pula for a person who chose 
to invest something and 10 Pula for a person who chose to invest nothing. Now, let's see 
how much Pula each of the five people participating in this example takes home with them 
from the experiment." 
9 We do, however, effectively set a provision point at zero, i.e., ifno one makes a positive investment in the public 
good, then the net payout to everyone is zero. See below for more details about the investment decision and what is 
meant by 'net payout.' 
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Participants in the information control group read through the example on their own, without any 
additional input provided by the researcher, and without the two additional sentences included at 
the end. lO 
To begin the experiment, each participant in the real treatment was provided with 50 Pula 
(approximately US $10) with which to make an investment decision in the public good. 
Participants in the hypothetical treatment were reminded that they would "not be paid anything 
more or less," while participants in the real treatment were informed that they were "investing 
for real." This type of distinction between the hypothetical and real treatments was reiterated in 
the directions for the experiment itself (see page 3 of the experiment in the Appendix). 
As the Payout Chart makes clear, the investment decision incorporates a free-riding incentive 
and a prisoner's dilemma (as well as the properties of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in 
consumption). The incentive for free-riding occurs because, all else equal, those who choose not 
to invest any of their 50 Pula obtain a higher payout than those who choose to invest some 
positive amount. A prisoner's dilemma occurs because choosing to invest increases the average 
group investment, which in tum leads to a higher payout for everyone. 
The investment question (on page 3 of the experiment) is presented in a standard single-
bounded dichotomous-choice format. In the case of the real treatment the investment question 
reads, "This question requires a choice for which your net payout from the experiment will 
ultimately be determined." The bid amounts (used in place of the "XX") were randomly selected 
from the interval (5, 15, 25, 35, and 45) Pula. 
10 The experimental design presented in the Appendix is for the hypothetical and information treatments. The 
designs for the other treatments are available from the authors upon request. The experiment is a simplified version 
of that used in Aadland et al. (2007) to measure the interaction between cheap talk and anchoring bias in CV. 
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After answering the investment question on page 3 (and thus completing round one of the 
experiment), each participant was provided with a Net Payout Worksheet. The worksheet 
enabled a participant to calculate her net payout from round one, and thus determine the Jotal 
amount of money she would have left the experiment with if this had been the only round played. 
Each participant then repeated the experiment again (round two), facing the same respective bid 
amount as was randomly drawn in round one. I I 
Upon completion of round two, a fair coin was flipped to determine which of the two rounds 
would determine the participants' actual net payout. The participants were informed of the coin-
flip procedure prior to beginning round one of the experiment. The reason for randomizing 
which net payout would actually be paid, rather than simply basing the payout on round two's 
outcome, was to induce the students to answer the investment question in round one more 
seriously than they otherwise might have. Finally, the students answered a series of 
demographic questions (see the Appendix for the specific wording of the questions). 
3. Data 
The experiment was pre-tested with a group of 30 graduate students in the University of 
Botswana (UB) Business School. Several changes were made to the experimental design as a 
result of the pre-test, mostly geared toward fine-tuning the instructions. During the week 
following the pre-test, approximately 100 undergraduate students from the Business School were 
recruited to participate in the actual experiment. 
II By not varying a given participant's bid amount between rounds we ensured that any change in her response to the 
investment question would be based solely on any additional information she had gained from completing the Net 
Payout Worksheet. 
8 
The experiment was run in four separate sessions (one session per day), with approximately 
25 students per session. Overall summary statistics for each of the variables obtained from the 
experiment are provided in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
As indicated in Table 1, fewer participants answered "yes" to their respective bid amounts in 
round two of the experiment than in round one (the mean for WTP j is larger than the mean for 
WTP2). Slightly less than half of the participants are male, and most are Botswana citizens in 
their junior year or below. Few participants classify themselves as being rich in income and as 
having fathered or mothered a child. The majority consider themselves as being "happy" or 
"very happy" with their lives. Few participants made "small" or "large" mistakes in calculating 
their net payouts from round one of the experiment using the Net Payout Worksheet. 
Table 2 provides an (unconditional) comparison of the percentage of participants who 
answered "yes" to their respective bid amounts in rounds one and two of the experiment across 
the hypothetical (hyp = 1) and real (hyp = 0) treatments. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The comparison between the hypothetical and real treatments in Table 2 suggests an absence 
of hypothetical bias (either positive or negative) in round one of the experiment, i.e., the mean 
values for WTP j (hyp=O) and WTP j (hyp=l) are not statistically different from one another at the 
5% significance level.12 To the contrary, the same comparison for round two suggests the 
existence of positive hypothetical bias in that round, i.e., the mean values for WTP2(hyp=0) and 
WTP2 (hyp=l) are statistically different from one another. Therefore, we find evidence in 
12 The means test for this ratio comparison, and each ofthe remaining ratio comparisons discussed below, was 
conducted using the online T-test tool developed by Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis (SISA), available at 
http://www.guantitativeskiUs.com/sisa/index.htm. The specific test used was Fisher Exact, which calculates an 
exact probability value for the relationship between two dichotomous variables, as found in a two-by-two cross 
table. 
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support of positive hypothetical bias in our sample of UB students, but only after the participants 
have completed round one of the experiment. I 3 
The results in Table 2 can also be used to test for the effect of information participan~$ 
received during the experiment. Specifically, the mean of WTP j (hyp=l) can be compared with 
the mean of WTP 2 (hyp= 1) to test for a between-round information effect in the hypothetical 
treatment, and the means of WTPj (hyp=O) and WTP2 (hyp=O) can likewise be compared for a 
between-round information effect in the real treatment. 
The means test suggests that participants in the real treatment responded to the between-
round information by reducing their acceptance of the offered bid: the mean of WTP2 (hyp=O) is 
statistically lower than the mean of WTP j (hyp=O) at the 5% level of significance. However, 
participants in the hypothetical treatment did not respond to this information: the mean of WTP 2 
(hyp=l) is not statistically different than the mean of WTPj (hyp=l). In other words, it appears 
that participants in the real treatment learned that cooperation (without coordination) does not 
pay, but free-riding does. 14 
4. Empirical Model 
The empirical model for estimating conditional treatment effects is premised on standard 
consumer theory. In our particular case, a participant' s true WTP (denoted WTP*) is determined 
by the share of his investment income (i.e., the 50 Pula provided at the beginning of the 
experiment) he would willingly forego so as to obtain the level of the public good he expects will 
13 These results concur with "the results of corresponding Chi-Square tests, as conducted in Cummings, et al. (1995), 
where the null hypothesis is that the likelihood of a "yes" response is unrelated to whether the WTP question is real 
or hypothetical. 
14 Although not presented in Table 2, we also compared the means for the prior information effects. We found no 
evidence that the prior information mattered. An enlarged version of Table 2 including the means tests for the prior 
information treatments is available from the authors upon request. 
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result from the experiment and still maintain his original (pre-public good) utility level. As 
discussed in detail below, we estimate a bivariate probit model to account for possible error 
correlation between the individual's first- and second-round investment decisions (Green,C;, 
2008). 
Based on their responses to the investment question, participant i's latent WTP* may be 
placed in one of two regions: (-00, i;) in the event of answering "no" to the investment question 
and [T;, 00) in the event of answering "yes," for i = 1, ..... ,n. We specify a reduced-form linear 
expression for WT Pi:j where the vector of explanatory variables Xi,j includes the hyp treatment 
effects and a subset of the variables described in Table 1: 
WTP·*· = X· .p. + E·· t,j t,j j t,j (1) 
where P j is a vector of coefficients,} = 1,2 denotes the round of the experiment, and the errors 
ti,j are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with correlation parameter p. 
The binary variable WTP;,j is defined in Table 1 and will equal one ifWTPi: j > Ti, where i 
does not change for the individual between rounds of the experiment. Using the definition for 
WTP;,j and (1), we can define the necessary probabilities for maximum-likelihood estimation. 
The four relevant probabilities are 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
11 
pO,O = 1 _ p.l,l _ pO,l _ pl,O 
l l l l (2.4) 
where cP is the bivariate standard nonnal CDF and (Jj is the standard deviation of fi,j. Th~ 
associated likelihood function is 
This is a bivariate version of the interval regression model described in Woolridge (2002).15 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates and associated standard errors from the maximum 
likelihood estimation.16 We find evidence that the round-one and round-two error tenns are 
positively correlated (p is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level), suggesting that 
estimation of the bivariate model is preferred over a univariate approach. For round one, only 
the coefficient estimate for bid r is statistically significant (at the 10% level), implying the 
absence of hypothetical bias and no effect of prior-information in round one of the experiment-
IS We also estimated separate binomial probit models for rounds one and two using the Cameron and James (1987) 
approach. The coefficient estimates and their associated standard errors from these separate estimations were 
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the bivariate model in (2). The results for the separately estimated 
models are available upon request from the authors. 
16 NLOGIT version 3.0.10 is used to estimate equation (2). We estimated (2) with both the full and a reduced set of 
variables included in Table 1. Since several of the variables were insignificant in those regressions, we dropped the 
demographic variables from the models presented in Table 3. We also estimated OLS models using WTPo as the 
regressand, but found that few of the variables could explain variation in this open-ended measure ofWTP. Both 
the input and output NLOGIT files for these models are available from the authors upon request. 
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a result that concurs with the unconditional mean comparisons shown in Table 2 and discussed in 
Section 3.17 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
However, the story is different for round two. The coefficients for info and hyp are both 
statistically significant (at the 10% and 1 % levels, respectively). Individuals in the hypothetical 
treatment are more likely to accept the bid than those facing an actual decision .ofwhether to 
contribute to the public good. In other words, we find evidence of positive hypothetical bias in 
round two of the experiment - again ~ result that concurs with the unconditional mean 
comparisons shown in Table 2. We also find that additional information provided prior to round 
one of the experiment helps reduce the individual's probability of accepting the bid, but the 
effect is weaker than for hypothetical bias both in terms of its magnitude and statistical 
significance. 
In addition to the bivariate model, we estimated two separate univariate models to check for 
between-round information effects on the respective sub-groups of individuals investing 
hypothetically and for real. These regressions relate to the unconditional means tests for 
between-round information effects shown in Table 2 (and discussed in Section 3). The results 
are presented in Table 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
In the first model, we investigate the behavior of individuals who switched from investing a 
positive amount in round one of the experiment to investing nothing in round two (i .e., for 
individuals who responded "yes" to their bid amount in round one but "no" in round two; 
17 We also regressed 't on WTPo to check for anchoring bias using a continuous measure ofWTP. The coefficient on 
T was positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting the existence of anchoring bias in our sample. 
However, without any variation in 't across rounds of the experiment, we are unable to identifY this effect in the 
dichotomous-choice framework. 
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chgwtpdn = 1). We find that the coefficient estimate for hyp is significant at the 1 % level of 
significance. This suggests that individuals investing for real were more likely to switch from 
having said "yes" in round one to saying "no" in round two. In other words, similar to ol!r 
, 
unconditional results in Section 3 we find evidence that individuals in the real treatment learned 
that cooperation does not pay, but free-riding does. 
In the second regression, we investigate the behavior of individuals who switched from 
investing nothing in round one of the experiment to investing a positive amount in round two 
(i.e., individuals who responded "no" to their bid amount in round one but "yes" in round two; 
chgwtpup = 1). We find no statistical evidence of hypothetical bias in this instance. Individuals 
investing hypothetically were no more likely than those investing for real to increase their 
investment between rounds of the experiment. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper reports evidence of positive hypothetical bias in a CV -based public good experiment 
conducted with university students in the African nation of Botswana. To our knowledge, this is 
the first such evidence of positive hypothetical bias for an African country - the only previous 
public-good experiment, conducted with university students in the country of Niger, reports 
evidence of negative hypothetical bias. 
Further, we find weak evidence that the sharing of additional information (about the public 
good) prior to the actual experiment has a negative effect on the probability that those investing 
in the public good will accept their respective bid amounts. The fact that positive hypothetical 
bias is found only in the second round of a two-round experiment - after participants have used a 
worksheet to calculate their respective net payouts from round one - suggests that additional 
14 
information provided during (i.e., between rounds of) the experiment is more effective than prior 
information in helping participants who are investing for real to identify their true willingness to 
pay for the public good. However, additional between-round information does not elimin,ate 
positive hypothetical bias in the sense that it does not help participants who are investing 
hypothetically to identify their true willingness to pay. 
In an absolute sense, the finding of positive hypothetical bias in our sample draws into 
question the hypothesis that Batswana exhibit a 'communal spirit' when it comes to the provision 
of public goods. By "absolute" we ~ean the degree to which cooperation in the provision of the 
good is feigned. The existence of positive hypothetical bias therefore suggests that a genuine 
communal spirit (what is commonly referred to as 'African communalism') may not be as strong 
in Botswana as we might have otherwise presumed. 
Further, the finding that additional information provided during the experiment helps only 
those participants who are investing for real to identify their true willingness to pay for the public 
good suggests that mitigating hypothetical bias in CV -based research will require more than just 
the provision of information. Additional mitigation measures will also be necessary, such as ex 
ante reminder statements (see Aadland and Caplan, 2006; List, 2001; Cummings and Taylor, 
1999) and ex post calibration of WTP (List and Shogren, 1998; Harrison et aI., 1999). 
The findings in this study should be judged with two caveats in mind. First, the sampling 
frame for the experiment is confined to UB business students. Therefore, while it may be 
representative of that particular subgroup of students, our sample may not be representative of 
the UB student body at large; it certainly is not representative of the Botswana population in 
general. Second, Botswana is generally considered to be an economically emergent country, in 
the sense that its economic growth since independence in 1966 has been both steady and high 
15 
relative to the vast majority of the world's other developing countries (World Bank Group, 
2000). Thus, generalizing this paper's results to the rest of Africa, let alone the lesser-developed 
world at large, is questionable. 
As a result of these caveats, the role for future research is clear. More public good 
experiments need to be conducted in Africa and other lesser-developed areas of the world, 
preferably with larger and more representative samples of university students and, better yet, 
national populations at large. Ideally, a variety of public good mechanisms, such as provision-
and non-provision-points, will be tested in the laboratory. As in the more-developed world, 
results from a broad base of experimental research will then help guide the design of survey 
instruments for field research throughout the lesser-developed world. Indeed, the current pace at 
which markets and non-markets (e.g., global externalities) are becoming linked internationally 
compels us to understand how welfare is determined within a more interconnected world. 
16 
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Table 1. Variable Names, Definitions, Sample Means and Standard Deviations (N=102). 
Variable Name Definition Mean SD 
WTP 1 
=1 if "yes" to bid amount in the first round ofthe experiment, 0.46 0.50 
=0 otherwise. 
WTP2 
=1 if ''yes'' to bid amount in the second round of the experiment, 0.38 0.49 
=0 otherwise. 
T =bid amount (5, 15, 25,35, or 45 Pula). 24.51 14.10 
hyp = 1 if experimental session is hypothetical, =0 otherwise. 0.48 0.50 
info = 1 if additional information about the example was given to 0.56 0.50 participants prior to the actual experiment, =0 otherwise. 
male = 1 if male, =0 otherwise. 0.46 0.50 
nation =1 ifMotswana, =0 otherwise. 0.92 0.27 
class =1 ifinjunior year or below, =0 otherwise. 0.83 0.38 
gpa =self-reported cumulative grade point average (5.0 highest). 3.36 0.59 
field =1 if accounting major, =0 otherwise (which includes not having 0.59 0.49 declared a major yet and double majors). 
rich =1 if self-reported income is greater than 3000 Pula per month, =0 0.14 0.35 
otherwise. 
middle = 1 if self-reported income is between 1500 and 3000 Pula per month, 0.54 0.50 
=0 otherwise. 
risk = 1 if risk averse, =0 otherwise. 0.42 0.50 
child =1 if a mother or father, =0 if not. 0.11 0.31 
happy =1 if "happy" or ''very happy" with life, =0 otherwise (including 0.80 0.40 
"unsure"). 
smprob = 1 if mistake on net payout worksheet did not preclude correct 0.09 0.29 
calculation of net payout, =0 otherwise. 
bgprob = 1 if mistake on net payout worksheet resulted in incorrect 0.21 0.41 
calculation of net payout, =0 otherwise. 
chgwtpup =1 if participant marked "no" to investment question in first round 0.08 0.27 
and ''yes'' to investment question in second round, =0 otherwise. 
chgwtpdn =1 if participant marked ''yes'' to investment question in first round 0.16 0.37 
and "no".to investment question in second round, =0 otherwise. 
WTPo =participant's ideal (open-ended) bid amount (in Pula). 17.17 13.86 
sense 
=1 ifWTPo was not larger than a bid amount that was rejected either 0.80 0.40 in both rounds or the second round only, =0 otherwise. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Mean WTP1 and WTP2. 
(Hypothetical vs. Real and First-Round vs. Second-Round) 
Variable Mean 
WTP] (hyp=O) 0.42a 
WTP] (hyp=1) 0.51 
WTP2 (hyp=O) 0.22a,b 
WTP2 (hyp= 1) 0.55b 
SD 
0.50 
0.51 
0.42 
0.50 
a,b Mean values demarcated with superscript a are statistically different from each other at the 
5% level of significance. Similarly for mean values demarcated with superscript b. 
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Table 3. Bivariate Maximum Likelihood Results for Rounds One and Two. 
Variable Coefficient (Round 1) Coefficient (Round 2) 
Constant 
info 
hyp 
p 
LogL 
Sample Size 
0.0886 -0.3576 
(0.3217) (0.3403) 
-0.0025 
(0.2542) 
0.2401 
(0.2529) 
-0.0125* 
(0.0090) 
0.7741 ** 
(0.1019) 
-115.0383 
102 
-0.3622* 
(0.2637) 
0.8458** 
(0.2637) 
-0.0069 
(0.0094) 
** Significant at 1 % level, * Significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Univariate Maximum Likelihood Estimation Sorted by 
Change in Investment Decisions 
Variable Coefficien t (chgwtpdn) Coefficient (chgwtpup) 
Constant -0.2151 -1.1988* ,-(0.5339) (0.5917) 
info 0.7513* -0.3873 (0.4565) (0.4413) 
hyp -1.5301 ** 0.4033 (0.4544) (0.4377) 
0.0020 0.0048 
(0.0168) (0.0149) 
LogL -22.5976 -21.6425 
Sample Size 47 55 
** Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix - Experimental Design 
Instructions 
You have been given 50 Pula to participate in this experiment. The money is yours to keep. 
You will not be paid anything more or less. 
Before the actual experiment begins, a simple example is presented. The purpose of the example 
is to demonstrate how an individual's "net payout" from the experiment is determined. Net 
payout is an amount of money that an individual receives based on (1) how much of his own 
money he chooses to invest, and (2) how much money everyone else in the room chooses to 
invest. The actual experiment that you and the other students in this room are going to participate 
in will begin after you have gone through this example. 
Example 
Suppose there are only five individuals in a room, each of whom has been given 20 Pula. After 
studying the Payout Chart below, the individuals make the following decisions: 
• Individual 1 chooses to invest nothing. 
• Individual 2 chooses to invest 5 Pula. 
• Individual 3 chooses to invest 10 Pula. 
• Individuals 4 and 5 each choose to invest 15 Pula. 
These choices result in a total of 45 Pula invested from the five individuals, for an average 
investment of 45 Pula 7 5 individuals = 9 Pula. Based on the Payout Chart below, we can now 
calculate each individual's net payout. 
PAYOUT CHART-THIS IS ONLY AN EXAMPLE 
Payout Ranges 
Average 
Group "YES, I'll invest" "NO, I won't invest" 
Investment 
Payout Payout 
(Pula) (Pula) 
Greater than 0 Pula; 5 10 Less than or equal to 10 Pula 
Greater than 10 Pula; 20 25 Less than or equal to 20 Pula 
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Begin by noting that for this example the average group investment of 9 Pula is between 0 Pula 
and 10 Pula in the Payout Chart, so we can focus on the first row of numbers. What this row of 
numbers tells us is that the payout is 5 Pula for a person who chose to invest something and 10 
Pula for a person who chose to invest nothing. Now, let's see how much Pula each of the five 
people participating in this example take home with them from the experiment. 
Individual 1 chose to invest nothing. He therefore receives a net payout of 10 Pula (10 Pula 
payout from the Payout Chart above less 0 Pula invested) and he leaves the room with a total of 
30 Pula (the 20 Pula he started the experiment with plus his 10 Pula net payout). Individual 2 
chose to invest 5 Pula. She therefore receives a net payout of 0 Pula (5 Pula payout from the 
Payout Chart above less 5 Pula invested) and she leaves the room with a total of 20 Pula. 
Individual 3 chose to invest 10 Pula. He therefore receives a net payout of -5 Pula (5 Pula 
payout from the Payout Chart above less 10 Pula invested) and he leaves the room with a total of 
15 Pula. Individuals 4 and 5 each chose to invest 15 Pula. They therefore each receive a net 
payout of -1 0 Pula (5 Pula payout from the Payout Chart above less 15 Pula invested) and they 
each leave the room with a total of 10 Pula. 
Are there any questions before we begin? 
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Experiment 
Directions. Use the payout chart below to decide whether to hypothetically invest some or none 
of your 50 Pula. If this experiment were for real, your actual net payout would be determined by 
your own investment choice and the average investment of the group, as was demonstrated in the 
example. Note that if the total group investment is zero (and thus the average group investment 
is also zero), the net payout is zero to everyone. 
PAYOUT CHART 
Payout Ranges 
Average 
Group "YES, I'll invest" "NO, I won't invest" 
Investment 
Payout Payout 
(Pula) (Pula) 
Greater than 0 Ppla; 5 10 Less than or equal to 10 Pula 
Greater than 10 Pula; 20 25 Less than or equal to 20 Pula 
Greater than 20 Pula; 35 40 Less than or equal to 30 Pula 
Greater than 30 Pula; 50 55 Less than or equal to 40 Pula 
Greater than 40 Pula; 65 70 Less than or equal to 45 Pula 
Greater than 45 Pula; 80 85 Less than or equal to 50 Pula 
INVESTMENT QUESTION 
This question requires a choice for which your net payout from the experiment 
would be hypothetically determined. 
Are you willing to make an investment of XX Pula? 
YES 
NO 
D 
D 
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Net Payout Worksheet 
1. Amount of Pula I was asked to invest. 
[This is the Pula amount that was included in the Investment Question during the experi~(:mt.] 
2. Amount of Pula that I agreed to invest. 
[If you decided to check the "Yes" box for the Investment Question during the experiment, then 
re-enter the number that you have written on line 1 above onto line 2. If you checked the ' 'No'' 
box for the Investment Question, then enter 0 on line 2.] 
3. My Payout from the experiment. 
[This is the number that has been worked out on the board in front of the class and that 
corresponds to the amount of Pula that you agreed to invest.] 
4. My Net Payout from the experiment. 
[Subtract the amount you have written on line 2 from the amount on line 3. Note that this could 
be a negative number.] 
5. The amount of money I leave the experiment with. 
[Add 50 Pula to the amount on line 4.] 
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Demographic Questions 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. These questions are very 
important to us. Remember that all information is completely anonymous and confidenti.al. 
1. Gender: Male D Female D 
2. Age 
---
3. NationalitylEthnicity ______________ _ 
4. Class Standing: First Year D 
Second Year D 
Third' Year D 
Fourth Year D 
Graduate D 
5. Cumulative Grade Point Average ___ _ 
6. Have you declared a major field of study? 
YesD NoD 
If yes, what is your major field of study? _______________ _ 
7. In which range do you think your monthly consumption expenditure currently falls 
(consumption expenditure includes money that you spend (and that other people spend to support 
you) for things like food, clothing, housing, entertainment, cell phone, utility bills, savings at the 
bank, etc. It does not include money that you give or lend to other people)? 
D Less than 1500 Pula per month. 
D Greater than 1500 Pula but less than 3000 Pula per month. 
D Greater than 3000 Pula but less than 4500 Pula per month. 
D Greater than ~500 Pula but less than 6000 Pula per month. 
D Greater than 6000 Pula per month. 
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8. Which would you choose? 
50 Pula with certainty. D 
D 
D 
50% chance of 0 Pula; 500/0 chance of 100 Pula. 
I ' m indifferent between the two choices above. 
9. Do you have a son or a daughter? 
Yes D No D 
10. Please check the box that best describes your current level of happiness in life. 
D I am very unhappy with my life. 
D I am unhappy with my life. 
D I am happy with my life. 
D I am very happy with my life. 
D I am uncertain about my happiness in life. 
11 . If you could have chosen an amount yourself to invest in the experiment that you have just 
participated in, what would that amount have been (taken from your 50 Pula)? ____ _ 
Thank you for participating in this experiment! 
29 
